Immigration Detention: Information Gaps
and Institutional Barriers to Reform.
Alina Dast
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines and critiques the institutional design
choices underlying the civil immigration detention system in the
United States. The stated objective of this system is to effectuate
removal orders and ensure public safety during the removal process by detaining noncitizens who pose a flight risk or danger to
the public. The design choices utilized to achieve this objective,
however, hinder the effective acquisition and use of information
regarding flight risk and danger. Reliance on mandatory detention, evidentiary limitations, and shifting burdens of proof create a presumption of detention. As a result, decision makers lack
the means or the incentive to collect and use information to release individuals who do not pose a flight risk or dangerincluding individuals who may not ultimately be removed from
the United States-at significant cost to the administration of
the immigration system as a whole.
Over the last twenty-five years, immigration detention in
States has dramatically expanded in both incidence
United
the
and duration. The federal government has increased the daily
number of individuals in immigration detention from 6,785 in
19941 to over 34,069 in 2012.2 The federal government now holds
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nearly 400 thousand individuals annually, in a patchwork of
county jails, privately run prisons, and other facilities across the
country.3 Detention has increasingly become prolonged, with
some individuals held for years pending removal proceedings or
the execution of a removal order.4 The government holds many
of these individuals under "mandatory detention," that is, without the right to an individualized bond hearing as to their risk of
flight or danger to the community.5
The expansion of immigration detention has sparked considerable discussion in academic literature. Scholars have critiqued the erosion of constitutional limitations on detention and
Congress's efforts to limit judicial review.6 Some have called for
legal and policy reforms, with the goals of scaling back or altering the nature of detention to conform to its status as a civil, rather than penal, institution.7
offices/ero/pdflero-removalsl.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (listing the average daily population in detention).
3 See Jailsand Jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. ImmigrationDetention System-A
Two-Year Review 1 (Human Rights First 2011), online at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
wp-content/uploads/pdflHRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
4
See Kerwin and Lin, Immigration Detention at 16-23 (cited in note 1); Issue
Brief: ProlongedImmigration Detention of Individuals Who Are ChallengingRemoval 12 (ACLU July 2009), online at http://www.aclu.org/files/assete/prolongedLdetention-issue
.brief.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
5 Dora Schriro, Immigration Detention: Overview and Recommendations 2 (DHS
Oct 6, 2009), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/aboutlofficestodpp/pdflice-detention-rpt.pdf
(visited Mar 3, 2013) (stating that 66 percent of immigrant detainees are held pursuant
to mandatory detention provisions). Recent studies question whether the majority of detainees are subject to mandatory detention. See, for example, Steering Committee of the
New York Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability
and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 Cardozo L Rev 357, 374 (2011)
(finding that the majority of detainees in a study were not subject to mandatory detention).
6 See, for example, David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L J 1003, 1006-07 (2002) (exploring due process limitations on
detention); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fearand Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 Tex L Rev 1615, 1616 (2000) (critiquing the "ferocious
assault on judicial review of immigration decisions); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation,
Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv L Rev 1890, 1928-31 (2000) (discussing constitutional challenges to mandatory detention); Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLaw after a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 Yale L J 545, 546-50
(1990) (discussing constitutional norms that underlie courts' protection of detained
noncitizens).
7
See, for example, Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth. The State of Mandatory ImmigrationDetention, 45 Harv CR-CL L Rev 601, 626-33 (2010) (describing recent efforts to
reform immigration detention and proposing additional changes); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking
ImmigrationDetention, 110 Colum L Rev Sidebar 42, 43-44, 50-56 (July 21, 2010), online
at http-//www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/42_Anil Kalhan.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
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This Article examines the immigration detention system
through a different lens: institutional design. According to government policy, detention serves as a tool of immigration enforcement-to effectuate the deportation of those who are removable under the law and to prevent danger to the community
during this process. 8 Rather than question these first-order objectives, this Article examines how the legal institutions and
administrative rules governing immigration detention affect the
government's ability and incentives to access the information
necessary to achieve its purported goals.
A growing body of legal scholarship has examined the administration of immigration law and policy through the lens of
institutional design. Professors Adam Cox and Eric Posner have
carefully examined the central design choices governing the
screening and selection of immigrants9 and the conflicting incentives among institutional actors within the immigration system.10 Professor Ingrid Eagly has explored the institutional design of criminal immigration prosecutions." In the context of
immigration detention policy, Professor Stephen Legomsky has
critiqued the federal government's preference for fixed rules over
administrative discretion.12 In this Article, I assess the institutional design choices that govern the acquisition and use of information in the current detention system, and the barriers that
these choices create for meaningful reform. By doing so, I hope
to add a critical perspective to the debate over the US immigration detention scheme.

8 See Part I. These are the purposes that the federal government has articulated
and that the Supreme Court has deemed as legitimate rationales for detention policy.
See Demore v Kim, 538 US 510, 517-20 (2003) (discussing the government's rationales
for detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings). Other possible goals-for example, to discourage unauthorized immigration or to encourage noncitizens to agree to
deportation or withdraw their appeals by making the deportation system more onerousmay also be motivating factors for detention policy. See Stephen H. Legomaky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U Miami Int-Am L Rev 531, 540
(1999) (suggesting a deterrence rationale). For the purpose of this Article, unless otherwise
stated, I measure the federal government's policy by the objectives that it has officially
proffered.
9 See generally Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
ImmigrationLaw, 59 Stan L Rev 809 (2007).
10 See generally Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants:An Optimal ContractFramework, 84 NYU L Rev 1403 (2009).
11 See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, ProsecutingImmigration, 104 Nw U L Rev 1281
(2010).
12 See Legomsky, 30 U Miami Int-Am L Rev at 535 (cited in note 8).
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Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the firstorder policy goals behind immigration detention and the applicable constitutional constraints. Part II examines the design
choices utilized to achieve these goals. I argue that the current
legal institutions and rules fail to ensure the adequate acquisition of information and, in many cases, prevent decision makers
from utilizing relevant information to make effective detention
decisions. Part III considers possible design reforms. Current reform proposals, while laudable, fall far short of addressing the
central design flaws in the immigration detention system. I argue that major design constraints, including an overreliance on
mandatory detention and counterproductive burden-shifting
schemes, must be eliminated to achieve meaningful reform.
I. FIRST-ORDER POLIcY GOALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS IN THE DETENTION SYSTEM

Throughout the history of immigration policy, the United
States has used detention as a tool for immigration enforcement.
Stated simply, the first-order policy goals of immigration detention are to ensure that the federal government may effectuate
its decisions to exclude or deport noncitizens from the United
States and to protect the public from any danger that may be
posed by noncitizens pending this process.a
These goals have been central to immigration detention policy for over a century. 14From the beginning, the power to detain
was tied to the power to inspect noncitizens seeking entry to the
United States. Detention initially served as an administrative
tool to ensure immigrants were "properly housed, fed, and cared
for" pending a screening,16 which more often than not led to en-

try.16 Subsequent legislation required the detention of certain "arriving alien immigrants" for inspection as a means of preventing

'o The goal of protecting the public from danger is arguably subsumed within the
goal of effectuating removal orders. For an excellent discussion of the development of the
dangerousness rationale underlying immigration detention, see Frances M. Kreimer,
Dangerousnesson the Loose: ConstitutionalLimits to ImmigrationDetention as Domestic
Crime Control, 87 NYU L Rev 1485, 1494-98 (2012).
14 See Daniel Wilsher, Immigration Detention: Law, History, Politics 7-13 (Cambridge 2012) (discussing the legal origins of immigration detention).
1o Immigration Act of 1891 § 8, ch 551, 26 Stat 1084, 1085-86 (permitting detention
"until a thorough inspection is made').
16 See Wilsher, Immigration Detention at 13-14 (cited in note 14), citing Immigration Investigation,HR Rep No 52-2090, 52d Cong, 1st Sess 100 (1892) (describing the procedurally lax process governing the detention and release of noncitizens pending inspection).
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flight, but the duration of detention was relatively short and
immigration officials exercised discretion to release immigrants
on bond. 17During these time periods, early Supreme Court cases
distinguished detention from imprisonment and recognized the
federal government's power to detain as ancillary to its power to
exclude or expel noncitizens from the United States. 18
For the next several decades, detention policy continued to
reflect the priorities of immigration enforcement, increasingly
becoming a tool for deporting immigrants whom the government
deemed undesirable. In Carlson v Landon,19 the Supreme Court
upheld the government's decision to detain noncitizens without
bail upon placing them in deportation proceedings due to their
alleged Communist ties.20 The Court explained that "[d]etention
is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the
United States during the pendency of deportation proceedings."21
In the late 1980s and 1990s, Congress vastly expanded the
deportation and detention system, enacting a mandatory detention scheme and providing new grounds of removal to trigger
such detention.22 Immigrant detainees challenged various aspects of the detention system, ultimately resulting in two Supreme Court decisions that reinforced the government's ability
to pursue its first-order policy goals within constitutional constraints. In Zadvydas v Davis,23 the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether the federal government may continue to
hold a noncitizen with a final order of removal even when effectuation of the removal order was no longer reasonably foreseeable.24 The Court interpreted the statute to require individualized release determinations if the agency is unable to remove
17 Immigration Act of 1893 § 5, ch 206, 27 Stat 569, 570 ("[I]t shall be the duty of
every inspector of arriving alien immigrants to detain for a special inquiry .. . every person who may not appear to him to be clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.").
See also Wilsher, ImmigrationDetention at 15, 17-18 (cited in note 14) (noting that officials
widely used bail to release immigrants and that Congress codified the practice into law).
18 See, for example, Wong Wing v United States, 163 US 228, 235 (1896).

19 342 US 524 (1952).
20 Id at 540-44 (holding that the attorney general may detain noncitizens without

bail on the basis of their Communist ties and that Congress's delegation of such authority was permissible).
21 Id at 538.
22 See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to CongressionalFolly, in David A. Martin and Peter H. Schuck, eds, Immigration Stories 343, 345-54
(Foundation 2005) (detailing the history behind mandatory detention legislation).
23 533 US 678 (2001).
24 Id at 690.
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an individual within a reasonable time after completion of removal proceedings, holding that "where detention's goal is no
longer practically attainable, detention no longer 'bear[s] [a]
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was]
committed."'25 In Demore v KiM,26 the Court upheld mandatory
detention for noncitizens with certain types of criminal records,
during the "limited period" necessary for the agency to decide
whether to order their removal.27 Emphasizing that such detention would have an end point upon completion of the removal
proceedings, the Court found that "[s]uch detention necessarily
serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be
successfully removed."28 While recognizing important due process constraints on the use of detention authority, the Court ultimately legitimated the federal government's rationales for detention policy in these decisions.
The combined effect of these first-order policy goals and constitutional constraints has been to give the federal government
considerable leeway to detain individuals who are-or may be
legitimately presumed to be-flight risks or dangers to the
community, in order to effectuate their removal and protect the
public pending that removal. Given the range of choices, the federal government's preference may very well be to detain as
many people as possible within this rubric. Such a policy would
benefit the federal government by ensuring the effectuation of
its removal orders and the enforcement of its immigration priorities.29 Some have argued that this in turn benefits current or
future immigrants, to the extent that removable noncitizens who
are not removed may displace noncitizens who otherwise would
be able to immigrate to and remain in the United States through

Id (alterations in original).
538 US 510 (2003).
27 Id at 531.
28 Id at 528 (noting that Congress was relying on evidence that indicated that permitting the release of immigrants pending removal proceedings would lead to many deportable noncitizens missing their court hearings).
29 See Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Deportation of Aliens after Final Orders Have Been Issued, Inspection Rep No 1-96-03
(Department of Justice (DOJ) Mar 1996), online at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reportsl
INS/e9603/index.htm (visited Mar 3, 2013) (describing how detention ensures deportation of individuals who have a final order of removal).
25

26
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existing legal mechanisms.3o Detention also prevents costs associated with certain negative externalities pending a lengthy removal process, such as any criminal activity by a noncitizen prior to her removal. 31
Detention also comes with its own costs, however.32 The federal government currently spends $122 per day to detain a
noncitizen facing removal.33 US taxpayers spend $1.9 billion on
immigration detention annually.3 Detention also imposes costs
on individuals detained-costs that may have significant ripple
effects in cases involving individuals with strong ties to the
United States. It deprives an individual of her liberty and prevents her from working, paying taxes, or otherwise contributing
to the community3 Where detainees have family ties, detention
30 Demore, 538 US at 518 (noting Congressional testimony that "[a]liens who enter
or remain in the United States in violation of our law are effectively taking immigration
opportunities that might otherwise be extended to others"), quoting Immigration Control
and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996, S Rep No 104-249, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 7
(1996). It is unclear what displacement effect removable noncitizens still present in the
United States may have on new immigration, as there is no direct correlation between
the number of available visas, for example, and the number of people the federal government has successfully deported.
31 Immigrants in the United States are generally less likely to commit crime than
US-born individuals. See Ramiro Martinez Jr and Matthew T. Lee, On Immigration and
Crime,in Gary LaFree, ed, 1 Criminal Justice 2000: The Nature of Crime; Continuity
and Change 485, 498-501 (National Institute of Justice 2000) (discussing several statistical studies on the relationship between immigrants and crime levels). As with citizens
generally, however, noncitizens who have previously committed crimes may recidivate.
Office of the Inspector General, Cooperation of SCAAP Recipients in the Removal of
Criminal Aliens from the United States 29-30 (DOJ Jan 2007), online at http://www
.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/aO7O7/final.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (discussing FBI statistical analyses of noncitizens with criminal records).
32 In addition to the costs discussed in text, some may argue that immigration detention also carries moral costs that outweigh any benefits to government or society as a
whole. See, for example, Laura Magnani and Harmon L. Wray, Beyond Prisons:A New
Interfaith Paradigmfor Our Failed Prison System 1-3, 30-33 (Fortress 2006). I share
this view, but for the purposes of this Article analyze the immigration detention system
under the prevailing legal and policy perspective in the United States that immigration
detention is permissible where properly tailored toward its stated objectives.
33 DHS, Congressional Budget Justification: FY 2012 938-39 (2012), online at
2
2
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-budget-justification-fy 0l .pdf
(visited Mar 3, 2013). The $122 figure does not include all costs associated with operating immigration detention facilities. See Unlocking Liberty: A Way Forward for U.S.
Immigration Detention Policy 11 (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2011),
online at http://lirs.orglwp-contentuploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCKINGLIBERTY.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (noting that the average cost of immigration detention increases to
$166 per day when salary and other personnel costs are taken into account).
34 DHS, CongressionalBudget Justificationat 938-39 (cited in note 33) (showing
that the cost for FY 2011 was $1,903,764,000).
35 See Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda and Marshall Fitz, A Rising Tide or a Shrinking Pie:
The Economic Impact of Legalization versus Deportationin Arizona 2 (Center for American

144

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:137

obstructs the family's access to caregiving and financial support. 36 At its extreme, immigration detention may lead to US citizens' reliance on public assistance or the placement of UScitizen children in foster care.37 Detention also has an adverse
effect on the administration of removal proceedings. Noncitizens
who are detained are less likely to find counsel than noncitizens
who are not detained.a Noncitizens who are detained are often
transferred far from home and face other obstacles to accessing
the witnesses, evidence, and support necessary to defend their

Progress and Immigration Policy Center Mar 2011), online at http://www.americanprogress
.org/wp-contentiuploadsissues/2011/03/pdf/rising-tide.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013); Legomsky, 30 U Miami Int-Am L Rev at 541 (cited in note 8).
so See Amy Bess, Human Rights Update: The Impact of Immigration Detention on
Children and Families *1-2 (National Association of Social Workers 2011), online at
http://www.socialworkere.org/practice/intl/2011/hria-fe-84811.immigration.pdf
(visited
Mar 3, 2013) ("When parents are held in detention, the subsequent family separation
poses great risks for their children.... Children experience emotional trauma, safety
concerns, economic instability, and diminished overall well-being."); Ajay Chaudry, et al,
FacingOur Future: Children in the Aftermath of Immigration Enforcement 27-39 (Urban
Institute Feb 2010), online at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412020_FacingOurFuture
final.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (recounting the effects of detention and deportation on
family economic well-being, specifically in relation to food and housing security).
37 See Seth Freed Wessler, Shattered Families: The Perilous Intersection of Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare System 5 (Applied Research Center Nov
2011),
online at http://act.colorlines.com/acton/attachment/1069/f-0079/0/-/-I1-sf-cl
-70140000000T6DHAAO-000ffl-sf-cl-70140000000T6DHAAO-000f:a81e/fle.pdf
(visited
Mar 3, 2013) (discussing the extent to which the detention of primary caregivers has led
to the placement of US-citizen children in foster care); Emily Butera, Torn Apart by Immigration Enforcement: Parental Rights and Immigration Detention 10-13 (Women's
Refugee Commission Dec 2010), online at http://womensrefugeecommission.org/
resources/doc-download/667-torn-apart-by-immigration-enforcement-parental-rights-and
-immigration-detention (visited Mar 3, 2013) (discussing the impact of detention on parental rights).
8 See Isolated in Detention:Limited Access to Legal Counsel in ImmigrationDetention FacilitiesJeopardizes.aFairDay in Court 7-8 (National Immigrant Justice Center
Sept 2010), online at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/siteslimmigrantjustice.org/
files/Detention%20Isolation%2Report%20FULL%20REPORT%202010%2009%2023.pdf
(visited Mar 3, 2013) (noting that the majority of detained noncitizens lack legal representation and the majority of detention facilities do not offer access to know-your-rights
programs). A recent study of representation for noncitizens apprehended in New York
City indicates that 60 percent of detained noncitizens lack legal representation, compared to only 27 percent of nondetained noncitizens. Steering Committee of the New
York Immigrant Representation Study Report, 33 Cardozo L Rev at 363 (cited in note 5).
The study also found that 74 percent of noncitizens who are represented and released (or
never detained) had a favorable outcome in their removal case, whereas only 18 percent
of noncitizens who are represented but detained had a favorable outcome, and only 3
percent of noncitizens who are both unrepresented and detained had a favorable outcome. See id at 363-64.
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cases.39 Moreover, detention creates an incentive for noncitizens
to drop their cases-even when they may have valid claims to
relief from removal (that is, relief establishing that it is in the
best interest of the United States that they remain in the country).40 For these reasons, many commentators have advocated

for increased use of alternatives to detention-such as governmental or community monitoring and supervision programsthat may achieve the objectives of detention at lower financial
and societal cost. 1
An optimal immigration detention policy would therefore be
one that limits detention to cases where the costs of release (due
to flight risk and danger) exceed the costs of detention (due to
the deprivation of liberty and its monetary and societal effects).42

At the time a person is placed in removal proceedings, however,
the federal government faces an information gap on these matters.43 Detention decisions are thus prone to what commentators
describe as Type I errors (or "false positives"), where the system
results in the detention of someone who should instead be released, and Type II errors (or "false negatives"), where the system results in the release of someone who should instead be detained.44 To minimize these errors, one would design a system that
facilitates the acquisition and use of the information necessary
to close the information gap, and to encourage experimentation
89 See Alison Parker, United States: A Costly Move; Far and Frequent Transfers
Impede Hearings for Immigrant Detainees in the United States 1-5 (Human Rights
Watch June 2011). See also Legomaky, 30 U Miami Int-Am L Rev at 541 (cited in note 8).
40 See Jennifer Lee Koh, Jayashri Srikantiah, and Karen C. Tumlin, Deportation
without Due Process6-9 (Western State University College of Law, Mills Legal Clinic of
Stanford Law School, and National Immigration Law Center Sept 2011), online at http://
www.stanford.edulgrouplirclDeportationWithoutDue_Process_2011.pdf (visited Mar 3,
2013) ("[Mlany [detained] noncitizens may ... have had little choice but to accept whatever the government offered."); Isolated in Detention at 7 (cited in note 38).
41 See, for example, The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies 1, 7-9 (National Immigration Forum Aug 2012), online at http://www.immigrationforum.org/imagesluploads/
MathoflmmigrationDetention.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (noting that use of Alternative To
Detention programs (ATDs) would result in an 80 percent reduction in detention costs
for the federal government); Alison Siskin, Immigration-RelatedDetention: Current Legislative Issues 15-17 (Congressional Research Service Jan 12, 2012), online at http://
www.fas.org/irptcrs/RL32369.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (reporting on the costeffectiveness of detention and ATDs and legislation in the pipeline).
42 As discussed above, some may argue that the moral costs of detention outweigh
any costs associated with release under this framework. See note 32.
43 See notes 45-47.
44 See, for example, Legomsky, 30 U Miami Int-Am L Rev at 545-47 (cited in note
8) (discussing "false negatives" and "false positives" in the detention context).
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and research to determine whether alternative policies may effectively serve the purpose of detention while lowering its costs.
However, as discussed in greater detail below, the design choices
governing the immigration detention system today tend to hinder the government's ability to collect and use the information
necessary to achieve its policy goals or experiment with alternatives. As a whole, these choices lead primarily to Type I errorsthat is, overdetention.
II. THE DESIGN CHOICES GOVERNING IMMIGRATION DETENTION

The effective acquisition and use of information presents a
considerable challenge in the detention context. At the moment
the federal government is contemplating whether to exclude or
deport a noncitizen, it generally lacks sufficient information to
assess the noncitizen's flight risk and danger to the community
pending that decision. The information gap is arguably widest in
situations involving "arriving alien[s]" at the border, when the
federal government may have little or no information about the
prospective immigrant.45 In such cases, the government has historically exercised its detention authority broadly, collecting information and using that information to exclude individuals or
release them based on ex post screening.46 The information gap
is different for individuals already in the United States whom
the government seeks to deport. In such cases, the prospects for
acquiring sufficient information are more favorable, and the
government may have a greater incentive to collect and use the
information it has to meet its policy goals.47
This Part focuses on the key institutional design choices governing the detention of individuals facing removal, particularly
45 8 CFR § 1.2 (defining an "arriving alien" as "an applicant for admission coming
or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry"). Under limited circumstances, the term may also be interpreted to apply to some individuals who have been
previously screened and admitted. Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)
§ 101(a)(13)(C), 8 USC § 1101(a)(13)(C) (listing several circumstances in which a noncitizen previously admitted to the United States as a permanent resident may still be considered to be "seeking an admission" to the United States).
46 See notes 12-16. Current federal law mandates the detention of "arriving alien[s]" but permits the federal government to exercise parole authority in its discretion.
See INA § 235, 8 USC § 1225 (authorizing immigration officers to detain "arriving aliens"); 8 CFR § 235.3 (setting out procedures for the detention, removal, and parole of
"arriving aliens" in the United States).
47 See Cox and Posner, 84 NYU L Rev at 1438-54 (cited in note 10) (exploring the
state interest in considering the effect of immigration policies on noncitizens who invest
in the United States through family, employment, and other socioeconomic ties).
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with respect to the level of discretion that the federal government has chosen to provide the agencies** making these detention decisions and the evidentiary rules governing such discretion. First, I address mandatory detention-Congress's choice to
narrow the window of discretion historically afforded to the
agencies empowered to detain and release noncitizens pending
their removal. Second, I address recent changes and constraints
on what remaining discretion agencies still retain to order release on bond. As explained herein, these second-order design
choices have a profound effect on the government's ability to acquire and apply information on flight risk and danger, despite
the value of this information to first-order goals.
A. Mandatory Detention
For most of the history of immigration policy, Congress has
provided federal immigration authorities with the discretion to
detain or release individuals pending screenings for admission
to the United States or removal proceedings. In 1988, Congress
passed the first mandatory immigration detention law, requiring
the detention of a specified class of noncitizens and depriving
federal immigration officials of the authority to release those individuals on bond pending their removal proceedings.4@ Congress
was apparently concerned that noncitizens were being released
from criminal custody for serious crimes before federal immigration officials had the opportunity to deport them.50 In the view of
48 Immigration detention decisions are made by a diverse set of actors within DHS
and DOJ. DHS officers make initial decisions to arrest, detain, and release noncitizens
within their statutory and regulatory authority. See INA § 235, 8 USC § 1225 (authority
to detain noncitizens seeking admission pending screening); INA § 236, 8 USC § 1226
(authority to detain pending removal proceedings); INA § 241, 8 USC § 1231 (authority
to detain pending execution of a final order of removal). Federal law authorizes limited
review of bond and classification decisions by immigration judges, employees of the Executive Office for Immigration Review within the DOJ. See INA § 236, 8 USC § 1226;
DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review: OrganizationChart (July 2012), online at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/Organization.html (visited Mar 3, 2013).
49 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7343(a)(4), Pub L No 100-690, 102 Stat 4181,
4470, amending INA § 242(a)(2), codified at 8 USC § 1252(a)(2) (1992). For an in-depth
discussion of the enactment of mandatory detention legislation, further amendments,
and subsequent litigation, see Taylor, Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly at 350
(cited in note 22).
50 See Matter of Eden, 20 I&N Dec 209, 214 (BIA 1990) (discussing legislative history and its stated purpose "to ensure that illegal aliens convicted of drug or violent
crimes are incarcerated until they are returned to their homeland") (emphasis omitted),
quoting Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act of 1988, S 2852, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, in 134
Cong Rec 27462 (Oct 3, 1988) (statement of Sen Lawton Chiles).
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some lawmakers, this inhibited the government's ability to effectuate the deportation of noncitizens who would ultimately be ordered removed but would abscond prior to their deportation,
that is, Type II errors. To address this problem, Congress created a category of noncitizens-people convicted of "aggravated
felonies"-and eventually barred these individuals from most
forms of relief from removal and from release from detention.51
In 1996, Congress vastly expanded the types of removable offenses that trigger mandatory detention to include offenses that
were not per se bars to relief from removal, like drug crimes and
multiple "crimes involving moral turpitude."52 Various other
"mandatory detention" provisions were also enacted to require
the detention of "arriving aliens"rs or individuals held pending a
removal period following a final removal order.54
Congress's choice to curb the agency's discretion to release noncitizens represents a classic "control strategy" given a
51 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7343(a)(4), 102 Stat at 4470, amending INA
§ 242(a)(2), codified at 8 USC § 1252(a)(2) (1992) (authorizing the attorney general to
detain and not release noncitizens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies). An
"aggravated felony" is currently defined by reference to twenty-one subcategories of offenses. INA § 101(a)(43)(A)-(U), 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U). Federal law bars any
noncitizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony from eligibility for many
forms of relief from removal. See, for example, INA § 240A(a), 8 USC § 1229b(a) (cancellation of removal); INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 USC § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (asylum); INA
§ 101(f)(8), 8 USC § 1101(f)(8) (naturalization); INA § 316(a)(3), 8 USC § 1427(a)(3) (naturalization); 8 CFR § 316.10(b)(1)(ii) (naturalization).
52 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) § 440(c), Pub L
No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, 1277, amending INA § 242(a)(2), codified as amended at 8
USC § 1252 (expanding grounds of mandatory detention to include other specified categories of removal); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) §303(a), Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009, 3009-585, amending INA § 236(c),
codified as amended at 8 USC § 1226(c) (same); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 USC
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) ("Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or
more crimes involving moral turpitude ... is deportable.").
53 "Arriving aliens" may be released on parole, but denials of parole are not reviewable by immigration judges. INA § 254, 8 USC § 1155; 8 CFR § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). See
also note 45.
54 For a ninety-day removal period following a final removal order, the government
must detain a noncitizen. INA § 241(a)(2), 8 USC § 1231(a)(2) (ordering the attorney
general not to release noncitizens "during the removal period'). If a noncitizen has not
yet been deported within six months of a final removal order, the agency is required to
conduct post-order custody reviews to determine if continued detention is justified. See
Zadvydas, 533 US at 690 (finding that the indefinite detention of noncitizens raises
many constitutional issues). The custody review process has been criticized as ineffective. See General Accounting Office (GAO), Immigration Enforcement: Better Data and
Controls Are Needed to Assure Consistency with the Supreme Court Decision on LongTerm Alien Detention, GAO-04-434, 11 (May 2004), online at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
250/242498.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (noting several logistical problems with the custody
removal procedures of DHS).
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perceived principal-agent problem.5r Lawmakers often delegate
their authority to an agency while simultaneously creating a series of rules to control the agency's exercise of its discretion.
Where the principal no longer believes that the preferences of
the agent align with its own, the principal may enact more restrictive ex ante rules to narrow the agent's "discretionary
window."w,
This is essentially what some lawmakers chose to do by enacting mandatory detention. Proponents of mandatory detention
perceived then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
as an ineffectual agent, unable to identify removable noncitizens, let alone deport them.57 Nor did they trust the judgment of
the agency to make decisions about bond.** Empirical studies indicated that over 20 percent of nondetained "criminal aliens"including individuals whom INS released on bond or declined to
detain at all-failed to appear for deportation hearings."g The
costs to the system were described as threefold: financial costs,
displacement costs due to these noncitizens "effectively taking
immigration opportunities that might otherwise be extended to
others," and costs associated with any recidivism by noncitizens
who are not removed.O As a result, some lawmakers concluded
"that detention of criminal aliens during their removal proceedings might be the best way to ensure their successful removal
from this country."61 Presented with statistics that INS was fail-

ing to assess flight risk and danger with sufficient accuracy,
members of Congress opted to err on the side of overdetention,
55 Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
Harv L Rev 1422, 1438-46 (2011) (describing principal-agent control strategies). See also
Sean Gailmard, DiscretionRather Than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Control BureaucraticPolicy Making, 17 Polit Analysis 25, 30-38 (2009); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the
Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraintson Agency Discretion, 51 Admin L Rev 429,
479-87 (1999).
56 Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1440 (cited in note 55); Gailmard, 17 Polit Analysis at 26-28 (cited in note 55).
57 See, for example, Demore, 538 US at 518. DHS is now responsible for the detention authority that INS previously possessed.
58 See, for example, id at 519.
59 Id at 519 & n 4, citing CriminalAliens in the United States, S Rep No 104-48,
104th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1995) (discussing appearance rates for "criminal aliens" released
pending their removal proceedings).
60 Demore, 538 US at 518-19, quoting S Rep No 104-249 at 7 (cited in note 30) (noting the various costs of an agency's inability to remove deportable noncitizens).
61 See Demore, 538 US at 521, citing Hearingon HR 333 before the Subcommittee
on Immigration,Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 52-54 (1989) and S Rep No 104-48 at 32 (cited in note 59) (describing lawmakers' rationale for the legislative expansion of mandatory detention).
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significantly narrowing the discretionary window for agency
action.62
As scholars have noted, however, such control strategies are
imperfect and costly.63 To be sure, the mandatory detention of
noncitizens pending their removal proceedings will all but ensure the deportation of noncitizens whom the government orders
removed, thus limiting Type II error. 64 However, detention also
imposes significant costs, with little or none of its intended benefits, to the extent that it covers individuals whom the government ultimately decides not to remove (individuals who are
granted relief from removal, for example) or who do not pose a
flight risk or danger to the community. Mandatory detention
policies tend to increase Type I errors by detaining those individuals even though the costs of detention outweigh the costs of
release in their cases. 65 Removing all discretion from the agency
to make detention decisions is thus an extreme measure and a
poor fit for imposing Congress's stated policy goals within constitutional constraints.
An alternative approach would be for Congress to permit
discretion but impose "enactment costs" to make certain types of
policy choices more favorable than others for the agent.66 For example, rather than prohibit the agency from collecting any information with respect to flight risk and danger for a large class
of noncitizens, Congress could have instead reined in the agency's discretion through procedural requirements, more exacting
62 See Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1440-42 (cited in note 55); Gailmard, 17
Polit Analysis at 26-28 (cited in note 55).
63 See, for example, Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1441 (cited in note 55) ('The
specification of a discretionary window is a relatively crude control strategy, as it entails
delegating unconstrained discretion within a range and totally prohibiting anything outside that range.").
64 Legomsky, 30 U Miami Int-Am L Rev at 545-46 (cited in note 8) (noting that
mandatory detention eliminates false negatives).
65 See id at 546-47 (noting that individualized adjudications avoid false positives).
Lawmakers may prefer Type I errors over Type II errors in this context, however, given
political considerations. Lawmakers may fear the notoriety of releasing noncitizens who
later abscond or commit additional crimes prior to their removal more than any
pushback they may receive for Type II errors where a noncitizen is unnecessarily detained. Professors Peggy Cooper Davis and Gautam Barua have discussed this phenomenon in the context of child welfare policy. See Peggy Cooper Davis and Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U Chi
L Sch Roundtable 139, 141-42 (1995) (noting the tendency of child welfare protective
services to remove children from their homes, sometimes unnecessarily, due to political considerations).
66 See Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1442 (cited in note 55) (describing the use of
enactment costs to influence agency preferences).
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review, or other mechanisms to ensure that the agency's use of
discretion aligned more closely with Congress's goals.67 By forgoing these more nuanced options, Congress designed a system
that incentivizes the agency to ignore information about flight
risk and danger for a broad class of noncitizens, who in fact may
or may not merit detention.
Undoubtedly, Congress may have felt that any alternatives
short of mandatory detention would be insufficient to align the
agency's preferences with its own. Given the statistics indicating
significant nonappearance rates where discretion was exercised,
Congress had reason to believe that the agency was incapable of
exercising discretion appropriately. However, a closer examination of the information before Congress reveals a wider range of
institutional choices.
First, the nonappearance rates that Congress found so problematic do not necessarily point to a misalignment in policy
preferences between Congress and the agency. Rather, the reason that the agency exercised discretion to release many individuals appears to be driven by resource allocation.** Studies indicated that INS's initial custody decisions-including whether
to detain at all or how much bond to set-were based in large
part on inadequate funding and lack of bed space, rather than
an individualized assessment of risk of flight or danger to the
community.69 Rather than depriving the agency of its authority
67 See id at 1441-42 (discussing how legislatures may employ a system of variable
rewards and penalties to influence an administrative agency's choices and how enactment cost mechanisms are "at least as good for the principal as is fixing a discretionary
window, and usually better").
68 See Taylor, Judicial Deference to CongressionalFolly at 348 (cited in note 22):
It was not a lack of legal authority to keep noncitizens in custody, nor a history
of making poor judgments about flight risk or dangerousness, that caused the
INS to have such a weak record of deporting criminal offenders. Rather, the
agency lacked the bed space to hold almost anyone being deported from the interior, and had no system in place to keep track of those who remained at liberty pending deportation or after a final order was entered against them.
69 In Demore, Justice David Souter noted that nonappearance rates prior to mandatory detention
tell[] us nothing about flight risk at all because ... the INS was making its
custody determinations not on the ground of likelihood of flight or dangerousness, but "in large part, according to the number of beds available in a particular region.". . . The desperate lack of detention space likewise had led the INS
to set bonds too low, because "ifthe alien is not able to pay, the alien cannot be
released, and a needed bed space is lost."
Demore, 538 US at 563 (Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting S Rep
No 104-48 at 23 (cited in note 59) ('[R]elease determinations are made by the INS in
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to release individuals, Congress could have imposed evidentiary
constraints that proscribe the agency's ability to consider funding
or bed space in its custody determinations and provided sufficient
funding and bed space to respond to any resource deficiencies.70
Second, to the extent that the agency was mishandling its
discretionary authority to release detainees, the nonappearance
statistics may have masked the source of the problem. Although
often conflated, discretionary detention authority operates at
two distinct stages during the commencement of removal proceedings. First, immigration officials must make an initial decision whether to detain an individual and, if so, what amount of
bond-if any-to set for that individual to secure her release.71
Second, an individual may seek a bond hearing from an administrative immigration judge to review the agency's decision.72
Much of the criticism of the agency's use of its discretionary authority involves the first stage of decision making: decisions by
INS not to detain individuals or to release them on low bonds
due to their lack of resources for detention.73 Thus, even if Congress chose to constrain the agency's initial authority, Congress
could have retained immigration judges' authority to conduct
bond hearings where flight risk and danger could be considered
and decisions based on impermissible factors would be subject to
review. The nonappearance statistics-which did not clearly distinguish between noncitizens never detained by INS, noncitizens
released by INS on a low bond, or noncitizens released by an
immigration judge after a bond hearing-reveal little if anything
about the effectiveness of bond hearings.74
large part, according to the number of beds available in a particular region.") and Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995, HR Rep No 104-469, Part 1, 104th Cong, 2d
Sess 124 (1996).
70 Congress has rapidly increased funding for detention beds over the last several
years. See Math of Immigration Detention at 2 (cited in note 41). The increases have at
times exceeded the amount that DHS itself has requested to cover its detention needs. Id
at 1. This may be due in part to lobbying efforts by entities that profit from detention.
See id at 4 (explaining the correctional industry's interest in maintaining and increasing
the number of immigration detainees); Stephen Raher, The Business of Punishing.Impediments to Accountability in the Private Corrections Industry, 13 U Richmond J L &
Pub Interest 209, 224-28 (2010) (describing how private prison companies influence legislative and contracting processes for private gain).
71 8 CFR § 1236.1(c)(8) (authorizing officials to exercise discretion to release certain
noncitizens).
72 8 CFR § 1236.1(d) (authorizing noncitizens to appeal custody determinations to
an immigration judge).
73 See notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
74 See Demore, 538 US at 564 (Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part).
One study of bond rates in Chicago, Illinois, attempted to examine the role of INS vis.--vis
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Third, to the extent that Congress was attempting to improve INS's ultimate success in deporting individuals in light of
high nonappearance rates, Congress had a choice in addressing
other inefficiencies in the system. Congressional reports leading
to the implementation of mandatory detention repeatedly referred to the agency's ineffectual identification and recordkeeping systems.75 Studies have indicated that, in a significant
percentage of cases, INS failed to notify noncitizens of the pending removal proceedings against them.76 Congress could have
taken steps to enhance the agency's ability to identify and notify
removable noncitizens of their hearings, rather than resorting to
mandatory detention as its primary solution to a more nuanced
problem.
Similarly, Congress did not consider alternative methods of
securing the appearance of noncitizens for removal hearings, including evidence-based community supervision programs. At the
time that Congress was depriving INS of its discretionary authority to release a large subset of noncitizens, INS was examining how it might improve its monitoring capacity77 The agency
contracted with the Vera Institute of Justice to develop the "Appearance Assistance Program," an alternative to traditional detention that ensured community supervision and appearance of

immigration judges in setting bond, finding that immigration judges lowered bond rates
in about 95 percent of all cases where a detained noncitizen sought a bond redetermination hearing. Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in DeportationCases: The Role of Immigration
Judges, 24 San Diego L Rev 347, 369 (1987). The study found about 95 percent of noncitizens released on bond by an immigration judge appeared at their next hearing. Id at
379. However, only 63-80 percent of individuals in the study who were released following a bond redetermination hearing complied with orders to voluntarily depart or to surrender for deportation. Id at 390. The author of the study recommended further analysis to
determine the relationship of bond amounts with compliance rates. Id at 407-08.
75 See Demore, 538 US at 518 ("Congress' investigations showed, however, that the
INS could not even identify most deportable aliens, much less locate them and remove
them from the country.'), citing S Rep No 104-48 at 1 (cited in note 59).
76 See GAO, Immigration Controk The Central Address File Needs to Be More Accurate, GAO/GGD-92-20, 3, 7 (Jan 1992), online at http://www.gao.gov/assetaf220/215432.pdf
(visited Mar 3, 2013) (estimating that INS fails to notify approximately 12 percent of
noncitizens of their hearings because of inaccuracies in recording the names and addresses of the noncitizens and/or their representatives); GAO, Immigration Control: Deporting and Excluding Aliens from the United States, GAO/GGD-90-18, 3, 22-38 (Oct
1989), online at http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/148384.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) ("[N]onappearance can be attributed, in part, to aliens not being notified by the INS of the time
and place of their hearings.').
77 See Taylor, JudicialDeference to CongressionalFolly at 351-54 (cited in note 22)
(discussing INS's exploration of monitoring improvements as Congress debated detention
policies).
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noncitizens for the removal process at significantly lower costs.78
Congress implemented mandatory detention before giving the
agency an opportunity to implement these alternative methods
on a larger scale.
Finally, to the extent Congress felt it necessary to rely on
mandatory detention despite the alternatives, Congress had a
choice in how it defined the class of individuals subject to mandatory detention. When it first enacted mandatory detention in
1988, it created a new class of noncitizens-individuals convicted of "aggravated felonies"-who faced the most severe immigration penalties.79 Congress gradually eliminated this class of immigrants from eligibility for most forms of relief from removal.80
Thus, to the extent that the primary purpose of mandatory detention was to ensure the deportation of individuals who must
be swiftly removed, narrowly defining the scope of deportation to
fit this class would serve Congress's purpose. However, in 1996,
Congress vastly expanded the class of individuals who are subject to mandatory detention, including individuals who by law
remain eligible for relief from removal.e1 People who are eligible
for relief from removal have a stronger incentive to appear in

78 See id. According to an evaluation of the Appearance Assistance Program, 91
percent of all participants (and 94 percent of "criminal alien" participants) in the intensive supervision program appeared for their hearings. See Eileen Sullivan, et al, 1 Testing Community Supervision for the INS: An Evaluation of the Appearance Assistance
Programii, 3 (Vera Institute of Justice Aug 1, 2000), online at http://www.vera.org/sites/
default/files/resourcesidownloads/INS_finalreport.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
79 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7343(a)(4), 102 Stat at 4470, amending INA
§ 242(a)(2), codified at 8 USC § 1252(a)(2) (1992) (granting the attorney general the power to
hold noncitizens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies in custody without bond).
s0 See notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
81 See AEDPA § 440(c), 110 Stat at 1277, amending INA § 242(a)(2), codified as
amended at 8 USC § 1252(a)(2) (expanding the grounds of removal triggering mandatory
detention); IIRIRA § 303(a), 110 Stat at 3009-585, amending INA § 236(c), codified as
amended at 8 USC § 1226(c) (same). Congress's expanded list of offenses triggering
mandatory detention corresponded to the list of offenses for which Congress initially
eliminated most discretionary relief from removal in AEDPA. Compare AEDPA § 440(c),
110 Stat at 1277 (referencing several criminal grounds of removal in addition to the "aggravated felony" ground), with IIRIRA § 306, 110 Stat at 3009-607 (providing a complete
rewrite of INA § 242) and IIRIRA § 303(a), 110 Stat at 2009-585 (reenacting the provisions from AEDPA § 440(c) that IIRIRA § 306 repealed as INA § 236(c)). Congress subsequently restored relief to lawful permanent residents, except for those convicted of aggravated felonies. See INA § 240A(a), 8 USC § 1229b(a) (restricting permanent residents
who have been convicted of an "aggravated felony" from cancellation of removal). It failed
to make a corresponding change to the mandatory detention statute. See INA § 2 36(c)(1),
8 USC § 1226(c)(1). As a result, many individuals who are eligible for relief from removal
are nonetheless ineligible for release from detention pending their removal proceedings.
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immigration court to resolve their cases.82 Narrowing the class of
individuals to only those noncitizens who are most likely to be
ineligible for relief would avoid overdetention.
By failing to recognize the spectrum of institutional design
choices it had at its disposal, Congress opted for a relatively extreme change to detention policy to the detriment of more nuanced reforms. Moreover, by opting for mandatory detention,
Congress has diminished the administrative agency's incentive
to gather information by which to make optimal detention decisions.8 As will be discussed in further detail below, this hampers the government's ability to explore reforms and experiment
to develop better models, including alternatives to detention.
B. Bond Determinations
For most individuals in removal proceedings who are not
subject to "mandatory detention," Congress preserved the authority of the federal immigration agency to decide whether to
detain or release them on bond or conditional parole.8 For most
of the history of immigration law, such discretionary authority
involved a presumption against detention, with the burden
placed on the government. In Matter of Patel,8 the Board of
Immigration Appeals explained the general rule that "[a]n alien
generally is not and should not be detained or required to post
bond except on a finding that he is a threat to the national securi-

82 See Bradley B. Banias, A "Substantial Argument" against Prolonged, Preremoval Mandatory Detention, 11 Rutgers Race & L Rev 31, 61-64 (2009) (arguing that
noncitizens should not be subject to mandatory detention if they have a substantial argument against their deportability). The agency's own process for reviewing whether a
noncitizen is properly subject to mandatory detention does not take eligibility for relief
from removal into account and is limited to determining whether the government is
"substantially unlikely to prevail" on the charges subjecting the noncitizen to mandatory
detention, a standard which is highly skewed against the detainee. In re Joseph, 22 I&N
Dec 799, 807 (BIA 1999); Julie Dona, Making Sense of "SubstantiallyUnlikely"- An Empirical Analysis of the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody Hearings,
Georgetown Immig L J *3, 42-43 (forthcoming 2013), online at http://papers.sarn.com/
sol3lpapers.cfm?abstract_id=1856758 (visited Mar 3, 2013). Such a narrow inquiry and
skewed burden of proof do little to ensure that the agency is making optimal decisions
regarding the proper application of the mandatory detention statute.
83 See Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1444 (cited in note 55) (describing how ex
ante substantive and procedural constraints on an agent's discretion reduces the agent's
incentive to acquire better information about its choices).
84 See INA § 236(a), 8 USC § 1226(a) (granting the attorney general the authority
to arrest and detain noncitizens as well as to release them on bond or conditional parole).
85 15 I&N Dec 666 (BIA 1976).
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ty, or that he is a poor bail risk."8s Noncitizens who were detained at high bond or denied bond in the agency's discretion
were able to seek a bond redetermination hearing by an immigration judge. At such a hearing, the government would be required to demonstrate sufficient flight risk or danger to justify its
bond decision.87
Following the 1996 immigration law reforms, the INS proposed a rule change to shift the burden in bond cases from the
government to the noncitizen.8* The resulting regulation provides that
[a]ny officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in
the officer's discretion, release an alien not [subject to mandatory detention] provided that the alien must demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not
pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is
likely to appear for any future proceeding.89
In responding to comments that the rule would represent "a reversal of long established procedure that provides that a noncriminal alien is presumptively eligible for release," INS explained that it "has been strongly criticized for its failure to
remove aliens who are not detained" and that the "mandate of
Congress, as evidenced by budget enhancements and other legislation, is increased detention to ensure removal."90
The shifting of evidentiary burdens marks another institutional design choice that may have profound effects on the government's incentive to acquire information in reaching optimal
detention decisions. As is true in other contexts, the placement
of the burden and the amount of evidence required affects the incentives of the parties to gather necessary evidence. For example,
in the criminal context, the placement of a high burden of proof
upon the government strengthens the government's incentive to
86 Id at 666 (citations omitted) (explaining the limited circumstances in which
noncitizens should be detained).
87 Id at 666-67 (noting the lack of evidence establishing that a noncitizen is a flight
risk or danger to the community).
88 Proposed Rule: Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed Reg 443,
483 (1997) (proposing changes to the burden of proof for contesting immigration detention).
89 8 CFR § 1236.1(c)(8) (placing the burden on noncitizens to prove that they are
not dangers to the community or flight risks).
90 Final Rule: Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal
of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed Reg 10312,
10323 (1997).
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acquire and use information to meet its burden-particularly
because the default option (that the defendant is acquitted) in
the absence of this effort is, at least ex ante, undesirable to the
government.91 The shift in burden for discretionary detention cases is
therefore problematic. It affects detention decisions at both
stages of the process. It makes it easier for the agency to detain
individuals in the first place because the agency has little incentive to gather information prior to the arrest of an individual for
removal proceedings and the noncitizen has no ability to present
favorable evidence prior to the agency's decision. At a subsequent bond hearing, the agency has little incentive to produce
evidence that may be relevant to a more optimal bond determination. Presumably, its preference is to maintain the status quo
based on its initial (albeit potentially flawed) detention decision.92 If anything, it may choose to produce additional adverse
evidence-such as criminal records or immigration history documents-as part of its pursuit of the removal charge itself. This
leaves the noncitizen with the burden of establishing positive
equities in light of a baseline record that may already be skewed
against her.
If a noncitizen and the agency had equal access to favorable
equities, the placement of the evidentiary burden arguably
would have little effect on the outcome of a bond hearing. In fact,
one might assume that a noncitizen would have better access to
evidence of positive equities on flight risk or danger to the community, such as evidence of length of residency, family ties, and
employment history.93 However, detention itself makes such information acquisition relatively difficult for the noncitizen. Detained noncitizens have no right to government-appointed counsel.e4 Detained noncitizens may be held in any facility across the
United States, and many are transferred far from their families
91 See Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1448 (cited in note 55) ("A prosecutor who
believes a defendant to be guilty is more likely to invest heavily in evidence gathering if
she knows she must prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt than if she knows she
must prove her case only by a preponderance of the evidence.').
92 See Davis and Barua, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 148-50 (cited in note 65)
(discussing "status quo bias" and empirical studies that indicate that decision makers
may prefer not to disrupt the status quo).
93 See In re Guerra,24 I&N Dec 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (listing the factors an immigration judge may consider in assessing bond).
94 See INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 USC § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (providing a noncitizen with "the
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's
choosing"). See also INA § 292, 8 USC § 1362.

158

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:137

and communities.95 An unrepresented detainee's ability to gather sufficient evidence to meet her burden of proof may be quite
limited. Given these realities, one may expect that a burdenshifting scheme that favors the agency over the noncitizen will
lead to suboptimal, ex post detention outcomes that maintain
the status quo of detention.
Other institutional rules also hinder the agency's ability to
acquire and use information to make optimal detention decisions.9* For example, current rules constrain the ability of the
agency to release detainees under nonfinancial conditions or to
consider a detainee's financial ability in setting bond. By statute, Congress authorizes the attorney general to release a detained individual on bond "of at least $1,500" or "conditional parole."97 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
therefore statutorily prohibited from setting a bond of less than
$1,500, even though it has the discretion not to detain the individual in the first instance or to release a detained individual
through conditional parole.98 In reviewing bond decisions by
DHS, immigration judges also have interpreted this rule as prohibiting them from setting a bond lower than $1,500.99 However,
many immigration judges constrain themselves even further by
interpreting the law as prohibiting them from releasing noncitizens on any conditions other than bond.100 Some immigration
judges, for example, view themselves as unable to release individuals on their own recognizance-even when presented with

See note 39.
See Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1449 (cited in note 55) (noting that the exclusion of otherwise probative evidence is another institutional rule that principals use to
constrain agents).
97 INA § 236(a), 8 USC § 1226(a) (setting out procedures for the arrest, detention,
and release of noncitizens).
98 See Matter of Garcia-Garcia,25 I&N Dec 93, 97 (BIA 2009) ('The plain language
of section 236(a) gives the Attorney General the authority, which is shared with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to place conditions on an alien's release from custody when
setting a monetary bond of at least $1,500.").
99 See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Judge Benchbook*
Bond Guide I I.E.2 (DOJ 2009), online at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/
Bond%20Guide.htm (visited Mar 3, 2013) ("For non-mandatory custody aliens, Immigration Judges can: (1) continue to detain; or (2) release on bond of not less than
$1,500.00."), citing INA § 236(a), 8 USC § 1226(a).
100 See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Judge Benchbook at
I I.E.2id (cited in note 99) (stating that immigration judges may release noncitizens who
are not subject to mandatory detention on bond but "[s]ection 236(a) of the Act does not
provide for the release of an alien on the alien's own recognizance).
95
96
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evidence that the noncitizen, while lacking flight risk or dangerousness, is simply unable to afford a bond. 101
There is little evidence to suggest that such restrictions are
necessary to secure appearance in court or protect public safety.
In the criminal context, for example, financial ability is well established as a factor in the determination of bail and officials retain broad authority to release people on recognizance.102 While
excessive bail rates have come under fire in both the criminal
and immigration systems, a recent New York-based study found
that defendants in criminal court were seventy-five times more
likely to be released on their own recognizance than noncitizens
in immigration detention and that bail rates in the criminal justice system tended to be much lower than the bond rates in the
immigration system. 03 As a result of high bond rates, 55 percent
of noncitizens apprehended in New York for removal proceedings who received a bond determination nonetheless remain detained because of an inability to pay. 04 The more restrictive
rules governing bond in immigration proceedings thus appear to
be leading to high rates of detention among those eligible for release, with little evidence that such detention is necessary to secure appearance in court in the face of less restrictive-and less
costly-alternatives.
III. IMMIGRATION DETENTION REFORM

As described above, immigration detention policy has undergone significant changes in the last several years to address
101 Unpublished agency decisions have held that the statute "does not provide any
authority for releasing an alien on his or her own recognizance." In re Muhammed
Ghabboun, 2004 WL 1739018, *1 (BIA) (dismissing a noncitizen's appeal of the denial of
his request to be released from immigration detention on his own recognizance). Some
decisions indicate that release on recognizance may be possible if the immigration judge
requires sufficient supervisory conditions. See, for example, In re Martin MirelesNevarez, 2004 WL 848429, *1-2 (BIA) ("In releasing the respondent on his own recognizance without placing any conditions on the respondent to insure his appearance at future proceedings, the Immigration Judge did not comply with section 236(a)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act") (emphasis added).
102 See 18 USC § 3142(b), (g)(3) (allowing federal criminal defendants to be released
on bond pending trial and requiring a consideration of financial resources as a factor in
determining bond).
103 See Insecure Communities, Devastated Families: New Dataon Immigrant Detention and DeportationPracticesin New York City 2, 8-10 (NYU School of Law Immigrant
Rights Clinic, Immigrant Defense Project, and Families for Freedom July 23, 2012), online
at http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads2l2/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012
-FINAL.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
104 See id at 11.
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a perceived principal-agent problem regarding INS's release of
noncitizens who pose a flight risk or danger to the community.
Unfortunately, these changes have resulted in legal and institutional rules that prevent the agency from collecting and utilizing
the information necessary to reach optimal detention decisions.
As a result, the system is now characterized by overdetention,
with a significant percentage of detainees never receiving an individualized assessment of their flight risk or danger to the
community.
Current agency-led proposals for reform do not adequately
address this imbalance.1on In 2009, DHS announced an overhaul
of the immigration detention system.10 Its proposed reforms focus primarily on improving detention conditions, in recognition
of the overly penal nature of the facilities in which the majority
of noncitizen detainees are currently held.107 As scholars have
observed, however, the reforms do little to address the problem
of overdetention.108 The reforms leave mandatory detention, and
the burden and evidentiary schemes for bond decisions, essentially untouched.109 Congress itself has not acted in this area,
except to provide additional funding each year for more detention beds.
The failure to change these legal and institutional rules has a
profound effect on the agency's incentive to engage in meaningful

105 See Kalhan, 110 Colum L Rev Sidebar at 58-54 (cited in note 7) (noting that the
government has declined to undertake new reforms, such as exercising parole authority
more often and interpreting custody mandates not to apply to particular classes of
noncitizens, that would alleviate the problem of overdetention).
106 See DHS Press Office, Fact Sheet: ICE Detention Reform; Principles and Next
Steps *1-3 (DHS Oct 6, 2009), online at http://www.dhe.gov/xlibrary/assetslpressjice
detentionreformfact-sheet.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
107 See Schriro, Immigration Detention at 3 (cited in note 5) (outlining recommendations for improving the conditions of immigration detention facilities).
1os See, for example, Kalhan, 110 Colum L Rev Sidebar at 51-54 (cited in note 7)
("Though ambitious and important, the Obama Administration's proposals leave intact a
range of practices that contribute to detention's excessiveness for many noncitizens").
109 A repeal of mandatory detention would require an act of Congress. However,
DHS has the power to scale back the scope of mandatory detention by changing the way
it interprets the law. See id at 53-54 (proposing that the government could interpret mandatory custody provisions so as to not apply to certain classes of noncitizens); Heeren, 45
Harv CR-CL L Rev at 626-33 (cited in note 7) (suggesting that the government could interpret mandatory detention to apply only for the first six months of detention and to define "custody" to include electronic monitoring); Issue Brief at 1-2 (cited in note 4) (describing how the government's current interpretation of mandatory custody statutes is excessive
in light of the Supreme Court case law and the statutory language itself).
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research, experimentation, and reform.110 The agency itself has
little incentive to assess whether mandatory detention, as it is
currently applied, covers individuals who are not flight risks or
dangers to the community. Conducting such research provides
no direct payoff to the agency, as the additional information
would have no effect on the range of policy choices that the
agency is authorized to use. Similarly, the agency has little incentive to experiment with varying burdens in the context of
discretionary bond decisions. If anything, the increasing funding
stream for detention helps to ensure that the agency will prefer
rules that favor detention over release.
However, recent agency-led reforms include two important
proposals that, if expanded and prioritized, could change incentives or produce the information necessary to change incentives.
First, DHS has recognized the importance of funding and studying alternatives to (or noncustodial forms of) detention, such as
electronic monitoring and government or community supervision
programs, in light of the success of the Appearance Assistance
Program.", While DHS's current proposals and funding streams
are limited, they are a marked improvement over the resources
allocated to such alternatives in the past. However, current research may have limited application to the overall detainee population because people subject to mandatory detention are not
able to participate in these pilot projects as currently designed,112 and many people who might be otherwise eligible to
participate remain detained due to high bond requirements.

Nonetheless, the funneling of additional resources into these efforts will hopefully incentivize greater use and experimentation

110 See Stephenson, 124 Harv L Rev at 1444 (cited in note 55) (describing how ex
ante substantive and procedural constraints on an agent's discretion reduces the agent's
incentive to acquire better information about its choices).
111 See notes 41, 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the government's attempts to implement alternatives to traditional immigration detention).
112 Advocates have urged DHS to interpret the "custody" requirement underlying
mandatory detention to include intensive forms of supervision short of detention, such as
electronic monitoring and home confinement. See, for example, Nicole D. Finnie, Roman
Guzik, and Jennifer J. Pinales, Freed but Not Free:A Report Examining the Current Use
of Alternatives to Immigration Detention 24-25 (Rutgers School of Law-Newark Immigrant Rights Clinic and American Friends Service Committee July 2012), online at
http://www.law.newark.rutgers.edulfiles/FreedbutnotFree.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (arguing that electronic monitoring is a form of "custody" in the immigration detention context); Heeren, 45 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 632 (cited in note 7) (same). If DHS were to
adopt this position, its opportunities for research and experimentation with alternatives
to detention would increase significantly. See Heeren, 45 CR-CL L Rev at 634.
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with alternatives to detention for those who are eligible for release under current law and practice.
Second, the government's proposed reforms include the development of a risk assessment tool that, if broadly applied,
would narrow the information gap regarding flight risk and
danger for those in removal proceedings.113 Borrowing from the
criminal context, the risk assessment tool aims to use objective
criteria to guide the agency's detention decisions.114 It also systematizes the information collected on each individual upon
their arrest, rather than relying on individual immigration officials to decide what information is relevant and which details to
record.115 It assigns numerical weight to a specified list of factors
that the agency can use to quantify flight risk and danger for purposes of bond, supervision, and other release determinations.116
The implementation of a risk assessment tool presents an
important step forward in ensuring the acquisition of information necessary to determine the optimal scope of detention.
Presumably, the agency will be able to use the risk assessment
tool to make better decisions about the flight risk and danger
posed by a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, and thus it
will be able to exercise its discretion to release individuals from
detention on an appropriate level of bond or not to detain the individual in the first instance. Without changes to mandatory detention rules, however, the agency will nonetheless be prevented
from effectively utilizing this information to effectuate releases
in a large subset of cases. Moreover, it is unclear what impact
the risk assessment tool will have on the bond hearing process
that follows the agency's initial bond determination. Similarly, it
does not appear to affect the initial decision to arrest a noncitizen, as it is designed to apply to noncitizens who are already in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody.117 Thus,
its impact is limited. Where it does apply, its effectiveness will
undoubtedly turn on which criteria are used and how these criteria are weighted. In reviewing an early version of the tool, the
113 See Unlocking Liberty at 20-22 (cited in note 33).
114 See id at 20 (explaining that objective criteria will be used to guide a variety of
decisions, such as whether a detained noncitizen will be released and what type of supervision may be required).
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See Unlocking Liberty at 21 (cited in note 33) (explaining the risk assessment
tool as applying after noncitizens have been arrested and when decisions regarding
whether and how to continue to detain them must be made).
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees expressed concern that the tool "risks becoming a bureaucratic, tick-box exercise and may lead only to artificial individual assessments rather than real ones" and that its methodology "appears heavily
weighted in favour of detention."118
Nonetheless, the risk assessment tool represents the first
comprehensive attempt to use an evidence-based model to assess
flight risk and danger. The data could be used for testing different theories on flight risk and danger, and how much bond
andlor conditions of supervision are necessary to offset such risk.
In this way, reliance on risk assessment tools may encourage
experimentation and expansion of alternatives to detention.119
Moreover, if DHS applies the risk assessment tool to collect
flight risk and danger information in all cases-including mandatory detention cases-DHS will begin to have an empirical
gauge to measure overdetention. Even if DHS cannot use the
risk assessment information to release individuals subject to
mandatory detention, DHS-and Congress-may use the information to reconsider the breadth of the mandatory detention
statute.
CONCLUSION
In the end, meaningful reform does not appear possible if
institutional rules prevent or hinder the agency from both collecting and utilizing accurate, evidence-based data regarding
flight risk and danger to make detention decisions. Where the
rules create a presumption of detention, or bar decision making
altogether, the agency will have little incentive to research
whether the rules lead to optimal detention decisions. Given the
high costs of overdetention due to Type I error, the federal government should consider more radical reforms aimed at deossifying the detention decision-making process. In order to free the
agency from the current constraints on information acquisition
and use, and to encourage experimentation with more expansive reforms, Congress should eliminate or narrow the scope of
118 Alice Edwards, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of Person and
'Alternatives to Detention' of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless Persons and Other Migrants 81 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Apr 2011), online at http://
www.unher.org/refworld/pdfid/4dc935fd2.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (noting that while the
risk assessment tool is an improvement over past US practices it nonetheless may be
problematic for refugees and other migrants).
119 See id.
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mandatory detention in favor of a more structured, individualized inquiry. Such an inquiry must be governed by balanced
rules of evidence and a heighted burden on the government to
incentivize the collection of information necessary to make appropriate detention decisions.

